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ABSTRACT
Not all people with health problems are disabled. Some individuals
with severe physical or mental impairments, such as blindness or limb
amputation, continue to hold jobs and generally function satisfactorily.
They constitute, however, a group of potentially disabled individuals who
might apply and qualify for Disability Insurance or other disability-related
benefits if they were to lose their jobs or to decide that employment offered
an inadequate financial or non-pecuniary reward. Thus, disability, or a
health—related inability to work, is more than a medical problem but involves
motivational and attitudinal factors.
We specify a model of the application process, which we model as
choice under uncertainty about approval of an application for Disability
Insurance. We specify the possible outcomes to the choice process of an
individual in which the probability of acceptance for Disability insurance is
a key consideration. We then estimate a joint model of labor supply and
application to the Disability Insurance program based on the 1972 survey. We
then compare our results to the observed time series applications process
since 1976. Lastly, we estimate the sensitivity of the application process
to the probability of acceptance and the level of benefits.
Janice Halpern Jerry Hausman
Lexecon Department of Economics
140 South Dearborn M.I.T., E52-271A
Chicago, IL 60603 Cambridge, MA 021391. Tne Disabilit Insurance (DI' Program and The Disabled Population
Not all people with health problems are disabled. Some individuals with
severe physical or mental impairments, such as blindness or limb amputation,
continue to hold jobs and generally function satisfactorily. They
constitute, however, a group of potentially disabled individuals who might
apply andqualifyfor DI or other disability—related benefits if they were to
lose their jobs or decide that employment offered an inadequate financial or
non—pecuniary reward. Thus, disability, or a health—related inability to
work, is more than a medical problem but involves motivational and
attitudinal factors.
The DI program does not pay benefits to all the disabled or even to all
the severely disabled. Evidence from the 1972 Survey of Disabled and Non—
disabled Adults (SDNA) indicated that although 7.7 million adults between the
ages of 20 and64claimed they were either unable to work at all or unable to
work regu'arly,only 2 milliondisabled workers were receiving DI benefits in
that year. Therefore, 5.7millionadults who considered themselves severely
disabled were not receiving benefits under this program. In part this was due
to a surprising lack of awareness of the existence of the DI program, even
among those who are eligible for benefits, but mostly it is attributable to
the program's strict eligibility requirements. Although critics attributed
much of the tremendous growth in the numberof beneficiaries up through the
endof the 1970's to a weakening of administrative standards, the program is
still an extremely selective one, fulfilling its original intention of
providing benefits only to those with solid work records and severe mental or
physical impairments.
Protection against disability was not incorporated into the Social
Security program until 1957.The initial DI program provided monthly cashbenefits only to disabled workers aged 50 to 64 and disabled dependent
children of insured workers aged 18 and over disabled before age 18 who were
unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or to be of long—continued and indefinite duration." State
agencies made disability determinations and do so today. Under the DI
program today, a totally disabled individual between the ages of 18 and 65
with a sufficient number of quarters of coverage1 is eligible, after a five—
—month waiting period, for the same monthly benefits payable to a retired
worker who began receiving benefits at age 65 (known as the primary insurance
aiuount).2 Prior to 1980 individuals who applied and were accepted to the DI
program generally continued receiving benefits up to age 65. The frequency
of terminations was quite low apart from natural causes. Under the current
administration the frequency of terminations has risen markedly. This policy
is currently undergoing both judicial and legislative review.3
Between 1967 and 1979, a period during which no major legislative
changes took place, the number of individuals receiving monthly DI benefits
To be eligible for benefits, a person has to have earned at least $50 in
covered employment in 20 of the last 40 quarters, including the quarters of
disability. In addition he has to be fully insured. This means that he needs
coverage in half the quarters since 1950 (or the age of 21) with quarters
earned before 1951 (or the age of 21).
2 Those eligible as dependents under OASDI are wives and dependent husbands
who have reached retirement age, unmarried dependent children (including sons
or daughters disabled in childhood), and wives who have entitled children in
their care. Maximum limits were put on disability payments with respect to
the PIA by legislation, see the Social Security Bulletin, 44, 1981, pp.l4—
31.
3. The current situation (1985) has evolved once more so that the
Administration has agreed to halt widescale terminations and to readmit many
individuals who had been terminated from the DI program in the past five
years. A class action lawsuit for terminated individuals against the U.S.
Government is currently in the Federal court system awaiting judicial
action.71
increaseafrom 2.1 to 4.8 million. Over the same period, total monthly
benefits paid increased by a factor of 7.4, from $148 mililion to $1.1
billion. The number of people receiving benefits through a program such as
social security disability insurance can expand as the result of an increase
in the number of people applying for benefits, an increase in the percentage
of applicants granted eligibility status, or a decrease in the number of
people who terminate beneficiary status. Considerable evidence indicates
thatthedramatic expansion in the DI program that took place between 1969
and1976is attributable principally to the first andthirdof these factors.
The annual number of disability applications increased from about 9 per 1,000
insured workers in 1963 to a peakof16 per 1,000 insured workers in 1974.
In 1976, the rate of application wasstill about 14 per 1,000. During the
sametimeperiod there was no evidence of any increase in the percentage of
applicants who were eventually awarded benefits. Over the 1963 to 1976
period, this percentage actually decreased slightly, from 49 to 45 percent,
although it fluctuated considerably from year-to-year. The termination rate
did decline considerably mainly due to the decline in the death rate of the
DI beneficiary population.
Since 1976, a marked change hasoccuredin the DI program. The number
of persons receiving DI benefits increased from 4.4 million in 1975 to 4.9
million in 1978, but the number of beneficiaries fell to 4.5millionin 1981.
By October 1984 the number of beneficiaries stood at 3.8 million.1 The
number of monthly benefits awarded to disabled workers fell off sharply from
itspeak of 592,000 to a low of 298,000 in 1982. These trends are shown in
Table A. A very important factor in this decline in awards is that the
number of initial allowances upon application fell from about 40% in 1975 to























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































about 22 in 1980. The percentage had been as high as 51% in 1967. A
discussion of possible reasons for the very rapid decrease in the
percentage of initial allowances can be found in Lando et. al. (1982).
Not surprisingly, the large increase in the percentage of applicants
denied has led to increases in the number of appeals.1 A reconsideration can
be asked for at the state level and then a hearing can be called for by an
Administrative Law Judge (AU). Nevertheless, the percentage of reversals at
the reconsideration level decreased sharply also between 1975 and 1980. The
drop between 1970 and 1980 was 58% which exceeds the decrease in the initial
allowance rate. However, at the AU level the number of hearings increased
from 78% from 1975 to 1980. The reversal rate also increased at this level
from 48% in 1975 to 58% in 1980. While it is difficult to calculate
precisely the final deposition by year of initial application, a calculation
can be made at the year of final disposition of the application. In 1970,
48% of final dispositions were favorable. In 1975 this percentage rose to
almost 50%. In 1980 only 34% of final determinations were favorable.
Therefore, the probability of a successful application for DI has decreased
sharply over the past few years, even when all levels of appeal are accounted
for.
We now focus on an important factor in the determination of the number
of DI beneficiaries. Many models estimated on time series data have
attempted to explain the level of applications in terms of benefit levels,
unemployment rates, and other macroeconomic variables. A review of these
models is contained in Halpern (1981). However, consideration of the last
column in Table 1 demonstrates that while a decrease in applications per 1000
.Theadministrative process of the DI program is well described in Mashaw
(1983).workers of 29 has taken place since the peak year of 1974, thatthe decrease
has been 19% fron the more normal economic year of 1976. Overthat same
period the number of applications has fallen by only7.6. Eecause
disability rises with age the appropriate comparison figure probablylies
somewhere between 8% and 19%, but the relatively small decrease in
applications may be somewhat surprising given the sharplydecreased
probability of receiving DI. Also, the greater proportionof initial denials
means that applicants will have to remain out of thelabor force as their
case is being decided through the reconsideration and appeals process.
Therefore, the main reason for the substantial decrease in new DI
beneficiaries comes from the acceptance rate, not from the applications rate.
This paper builds a model of the application process on cross section data
from a 1972 survey, but our results seem to agree well with the observed
times series experience. That is, our results indicate that the probability
of acceptance hasasignificant, but not a particularly large effect, on the
probability of application. Potential applicants seem more sensitive to the
benefit level than to the probability of acceptance.
In the next section, we specify a model of the application process,
which we model as choice under uncertainty about approval of an application
for DI. We specify the possible outcomes to the choice process of an
individual in which the probability of acceptance for DI is a key
consideration. In Section 3, we estimate a joint model of labor supply and
application to the DI program based on the 1972 survey. We then compare our
results to the observed time series applications process since 1976. Lastly,
we estimate the sensitivity of the application process to the probability of
acceptance and the level of benefits.2. An Empirical Nodel of Disability Insurance ADplicatiorl
In this section, we develop an econometric model of the choice to apply
for Disability Insurance (DI). The basis of this empirical cievelopment is
the hypothesis that by specifying the available options and examining the
choices disabled individuals made, the factors that influence their decisions
can be determined and their relative contributions evaluated. Since the
choice involves certain outcomes, in particular whether the application for
DI will be approved, a model of choice under uncertainty is required. We
apply the Von Neumann-Morgenstern approach to choice under uncertainty in the
development of the model. 1
Of course, this study is not the first to look at the DI application and
labor force participation decisions of disabled individuals. The earlier
literature concentrated on showing that health was an important explanatory
variable in labor supply models and that dummy variable representations of an
individual's eligibility for DI benefits also significantly improved the fit
of a labor supply equation. Later literature tried to measure more directly
the factors that were relevant in an individual's decision about whether to
apply for DI —-factorssuch as the size of the benefit which he would
receive if eligible and the wage he can earn if he works. While it has been
successfully demonstrated that health is an important factor in the work vs.
DI application decision of impaired individuals, failure to develop and
empirically implement a structural model of utility—maximizing income choice
1• Considerable controversy continues to exist over the positive value of
the Von Neuman—Norgenstern approach as a description of individual
behavior under uncertainty. A recent review is given by Machina (1983).has left the role tnat the DI program parameters play in influencing this
choice of unanswered question. We attempt to specify and estimate a
structural model.
In order to make the problem tractable, the lifetime utility maximizing
framework will be considerably simplified.2 The discussion below is based on
a two—period framework in which an impaired worker decides whetherto apply
for DI benefits for next period by comparing his expected utility from
working and from applying for (but not necessarily receiving) DI benefits.
Of course, some individuals may be so severely disabled that they are unable
to work. But, the overwhelming majority of disabled individuals do work. We
take account of the severity of the individual disability both in the labor
supply decision and in the probability of acceptance to DI model.
The basis of the empirical analysis is a two—period utility maximization
problem in which an individual decides in period t whether or not to apply
for DI which will be received in period t+1. Ignoring the DI program to
begin with, let x be the total vector of goods from which an individual can
choose and assume all goods except hours of work h, can be aggregated into a
single consumption good, c, with price normalized to one. The consumer's
problem is to maximize a direct utility function u(c,h) subject to the
constraint that cwh +y,where h is hours of work, w is the net (of tax)
wage rate, and y is exogenous non-labor income (virtualincome with taxes).
The additional complication exists that because of the progressive
federal income tax and the structure of many income support programs (such as
AFDC and social security retirement), both the net wage andnon—laborincome
.Areview of the literature up to 1981 is given by Halpern (1981). A
recent paper is Havemann and Wolfe (1984). They estimate a reduced form
model which takes account of other transfer programs in addition to DI.
2 See Halpern (1981) for a theoretical treatment of the lifetime utility
maximizing problem.q
are functions of the number of hours worked. However, both of these
variables will be assumed initially to be constants independent of h.
The indirect utility function is the maximum utility attainable as a
function of exogenous variables w and y:
(1) V(w,y) =max(U(c,h): cwh +y).
Assuming the consumer does no saving, all income is consumed and the
maximization problem is a matter of choosing h.
The effect of the DI program on the budget constraint faced by a utility
maximizer will now be considered. Because of the program, the budget line an
individual will face in period t+1 has three segments that depend on whether
he applies for (in period t) and does or does not receive (in period t+i) DI
benefits.' Let B equal non—DI non-labor income and SSB equal the value of
the DI benefits an individual would receive if he applied to the program and
his application were accepted. {See Figure 1 }.Then,if he does not apply
for DI benefits, he will maximize utility along budget segment BA
corresponding to a constant wage rate If his application f or benefits is
rejected, he will have unearned income of B and will face a net market wage
of wA<WNandachieve a utility maximumonsegment BC. His wage if rejected,
is less than WN
There are several reasons to assume that a rejected DI applicant will
earn less than a non—applicant with identical personal and socioeconomic
characteristics. In order to apply, he must be out of the labor market for
five months and can then anticipate an average application processing time of
three months. The individual is generally out of the labor force for
approximately 1 year. If he should initially be rejected, appeal and then
For now we do not include income taxes in the model so that the effect of
the DI program on choice can be emphasized. However, we do include income
taxation in the model subsequently.HOTIRS
II
Figure 1. Budget Constraintwith a DI Program.
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have his appeal rejected, he would be out of the labor force considrab1y
longer. Several reasons exist to expect that a rejected apiican would also
re—enter the labor market at a lower wage than he would hre received if his
labor market participation has been interrupted. First, because his human
capital may erode during the time it takes to process his application and his
lack of recent experience may lower his productivity, his marginl product
will be lower. Secondly, employers may view his being out of the labor force
as an indication that his health interfers with his ability to work and
consequently may fear that poor health could force him to quit in the future.
Furthermore, insurance and pension costs may rise if this event occurs.
Third, a period of time spent out of the labor force may be viewed as an
indication that the worker has only a weak labor force attachment,
i.e., that he is undependable and it is probable that he will soon leave his
job. These last factors meant that the wage the employer offers will be
discounted for a risk factor and thus may be lower than the value of his
marginal product.
If the individual applies and is accepted for DI benefits his unearned
income will be B+SSB. Under current program regulations during our data
period, he is allowed to earn up to S50 a month without penalty
(corresponding to 112 hours of work at wageWA in Figure 1). If he earns more
than $50 his benefits are not immediately terminated but he is considered to
be engaged in a trial work period which may lead to termination for recovery
in future months. Because the form of benefit reduction rule imposed on DI
recipients is not easily diagrammed, the assumption is made that the
"implicit" penalty of potentially losing benefits is so great that his wage
is effectively zero for earnings above $50. Thus, his total budget
constraint is DEF. In the figure, maximization occurs at h0 on indifference
curve I1')
Assumethat the indiviaual i is working in period t and is deciding
wheth to work in period t+1 or apply for Di benefits which would be
received in period ti. Let d. index the severity of the individual's
disability. (The time subscript will be suspended unless necessary for
clarity). This index obviously includes a measure of physical and mental
health and functional ability, and may also include vocational factors such
as age and prospects for retraining which are taken into account in
determining eligibility for DI benefits. Based on this index, the individual
faces a probability p(d) that if he applies for DI benefits his application
will be accepted and he will achieve a utility maximum on segment DEF rather
than BC. His problem, under the Von Neumann—Morgenstern framework then, is
to maximize his expected utility in period t+1 by choosing whether or not to
apply for DIbenefits.1
An individual will apply for DI benefits if his expected utility from
apclying is higher than his known utility if he does not apply, assuming no
discrepancy between desired and actual hours of work. If he decides not to
apply, he will choose hours of work h=h* determined by Roy's identity
h= V /V,whichcorresponds to the value of his indirect utility
function, V(wN,B) =V1.
If he does apply for DI benefits, the probability is
p(d.) that his application will be accepted and that as a result he will
achieve utility level V'(wA,B+SSB)V2, where Vt () differsfrom v( )in
that a DI recipient's hours are constrained to be less than or equal to
$50/WA. In Figure 1, utility maximization occurs with h =0,although
different utility functions could lead to maximization anywhere on segment
DE. The contention that WA<WN means that applying for DI benefits is not
1. We also attempted, unsuccessfully, to include costs to the individual
apart from his lower wage from the time he spends waiting for the decision on
his acceptance to DI. This additional development is hampered by the lack of
information about state benefits that an individual receives during the
waiting period.costless and is important to the model since otnerwise almost everyone with
p(d1)>O who could reach a higher level of utility on DE than BA would apply
for benefits. If the individual's application for benefits is rejected, and
the probability is (1_p(d)) that this will occur, he will have non-labor
income B and will face a market wage of WA• He will choose to work h=h**
hours and the corresponding value of his indirect utility function will be
v(wA, B)V3. Therefore, according to expected utility theory the
individual's expected utility if he applies to the DI program is V =p(d.)V2
+ (1—p(d1flV3. If V>V1 he will apply for benefits, while if V<V1 he will
decide not to apply.
Since empirical models of individual choice under uncertainty are
extremely rare in the multigood case, we decided to take a common labor
supply model and expand it to model the choice under uncertainty. We begin
with the linear labor supply function for desired hours for individual i
(2) h.= ôy. + aw. + Z.y
where y. is non—labor income, w is the wage, andZ1are socioeconomic
variables. ther the indirect or the direct utility function is required
here. The integration of equation (2) to recover the indirect utility
function now must take explicit account of the constant of integration
because the cardinality of the utility function has a crucial role in the
theory of the choice under uncertainty.1 Ourparticularchoice of the
constant of integration leads to the indirect utility function
(3) e(y1 +
:2
+ = - -i
.Theimportance of the cardinality of the utility function thus differs
from previous applications of this methodology, e.g. Hausman (1981a,c).14
where 0 =1denotes risk neutrality and —0—1 may be interpreted as the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.' Similarly, the direct utility
function, which is used at kink points and at zero hours of work, is
calculated to be at hours of work H. and consumption x. =y.+w.H.





Inour first model which does not include taxes three possible outcomes
are possible. If the first action is taken and the individual does not apply
for DI his indirect utility is determined by his non—labor income y and his
-0/ -0/
market wage Wnfromequation (3), _V(wnYn) /_V/2The second
possible action for the individual is to apply for DI. One of two uncertain




where y =y+SSB,the sum of non—labor income plus social security
benefits. We have assumed that the individual does not plan to work if he
is accepted for DI. The other possible outcome is that the individual will
be rejected for DI if he applies. His market wage will be WAWT. and his
.Inthe multigood case, the Pratt—Arrow measures of relative and absolute
risk aversion are not as easily interpretable as in the single good case.
Here we are using the terminolo with respect to units of utility
(utils), given the cardinality of our utility function. We also estimated
the constant absolute risk aversion type specification of equation (3). The
results are quite similar to the results for the relative risk aversion
model.
2Ifthe individual decides to work zero hours, we assume that he will
apply for DI. We have dropped individual subscripts for the present.indirect utility will be _V(w,yC 0 -V 0. Civen a probability p of




(1-p) (_VA) /0] 0.
If equation (6) is positive expected utility is maximized by not applying.
We now consider the stochastic specification of the model. Three
sources of stochastic variation are allowed for. The first two are similar
to a previous specification of 1-lausman (1980, 1981a). First, within the
labor supply equation (2) we allow for different tastes for work. These
taste differences are assumed to enter in an additive manner so we use the
notation S. =Z.y+ 'r. where EYr. 0 •2The second source of stochastic
1 1. 1 1
variation is the deviation between preferred and actual hours of work. We
observe actual hours of work for those individuals who did not apply for DI.
*
We let actual hours h. =h.+ r• where E. =0and E(S.fl.) 0. Therefore,
1 1 1 1 11
the labor supply equation becomes
(7) b1 = +aw. + Zy +
where = +i. The stochastic components are separately identifiedhere
because of the non—linearity of the budget set, c.f. Hausman (1982).
To derive the likelihood function with these two sources of stochastic
variation, we assumejointnormality of and so that
With this stochastic specification the decision to
apply depends only on S since the individual chooses with respect to
.Ifthe individual works zero hours, his direct utility function can be
used.
2 Note we do not allow preference variation to enter through ó as in much
of Hausman's previous work. Problems of uniqueness of choice regions occur
in this case because of the presence of choice under uncertainty.
Determination of all possible choice regions would complicate the problem
considerably.16
preferred hours h.. Therefore, he does not apply if
-0,' 0/
(a) g(S1,®) =(-un)/®- {p(-U0)/0+(1_p)(_UA)/0J0.
Now it can be proven that a unique S exists so that for S.S. the
individual will not apply for DI.1 If the individual applies the






whereis the unit normal distribution. Here S is the implicit solution
to equation (8) which sets it equal to zero as a function of the estimated
parameters and data for each individual. For an individual who does apply,
we observe his hours of work. If these hours of work are greater than zero





whereis the unit normal density function and =
hj_(awn+óyn+Ziy).
However, the individual has zero observed hours of work if aw +óy +S.<0 or if
flfl 1
i isnegative enough and for these individuals the contribution to the
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1An appendix with this proof of uniqueness for the various models we
consider is available upon request.where B is the standard bivariate normal likelihood function. Therefore, the






where the first sum denotes applicants, the second sum denotes non—applicants
with non—zero hours of work, and the third sum denotes non-applicants with
zero hours of work.
Given the substantial effect on future income the decision to apply for
DI will have, we might well expect variation in 0 to be an additional
important stochastic component of the model. The restriction that 0—i is
required to rule out risk loving behavior so we use a density f(0) which has
support to the left of minus one. The distribution of 0 for an individual is
assumed independent of the other stochastic components of the model. The
decision function of equation (8) now becomes a function g(s,e) with
variation in both S. and 0. and the contributions to the likelihood function 1 1
takethe form
(13) j= fpr(S.<S.* o)f(e)de.
Note that the value of 0 determines the expected probability of application,
but it does not affect preferred hours of work because it does not affect the
ordinal properties of the utility function. The likelihood function for
varying 0 takes the form
N1 N2 N3
(14) L log£1j+ log £2j +.log
£3j• 3'l j1 j1
The BHHH algoritbm was used along with a numerical integration subroutine.18
Computer requirements were significant given the presence of numerical
integration.
We also included income taxes in the model. Only federal taxes were
used and a progressive tax structure was used. Since the method of including
taxes is similar to Hausman (1981a), we only briefly indicate the technique.
For an individual who does not apply, as S. increases from S.the
individual's net wage falls as his denied hours put him into a higher tax
bracket. His virtual wage is determined by y and the tax system. The
net,after tax, wage and virtual income then enter the labor supply function
of equation (2). Let S, be the value of S which marks the beginning of the
tax segment or kink point on the budget set. Then the contributions to the
likelihood function for a person who does not apply but has observed hours of
work which exceed zero is
(15) aisLments
pr(Sk< S < Sk+l Ic=)pr (c=)
for S>S.xi
kink points pr (Sk < S < Sk+l) (n=.)
forSk S*
2 2
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+ (Sk+1ZiY) (Sk Zil)]k
wherer1is the deviation of actual hours from kink point hours. For actual
hours equal to zero is formed from in a similar manner. The form of19
£remains the same. Variation in 0canalsobe included in the model with
11
taxes.
ehave specified three sets of models for Diapplicationsin this
section. One set holds 0 constant in the population, one set allows 0 to
vary and one set includes taxes. In the next section, we estimate these
models after we discuss how p, the probability of acceptance, and WA,the
market wage if rejected for DI, are deterniined.
1 Uniqueness of S can also be proven in the model when taxes are present.3. NodelEstimation
The data that will be used to derive empirical estimates are from the
1972 Survey of Disabled and Non—disabled Adults (SDNA). The samplesof
disabled and non—disabled civilian populations were selected separately from
households in the 1970 Decennial Census 5—percent sample. Both samples were
selected by area probability sampling methods to represent the non—
institutionalized civilian population aged 18—64 as of April 1970. Since the
sample of persons selected in 1970 was two years older in 1972, personsaged
65—66 in 1972 were excluded in order to restrict the sample to those of
working age.
In the 1972 survey individuals were asked detailed questions about their
financial status, including amounts and sources of income, family situation,
and kind of job currently or previously held. In addition, detailed current
health and health—history questions were asked, including time of onset of
health problems, current limitations in functional capacity, and extent to
which health problems interfere with work. Because of the extensive
information on health status, this data sample makes it possible to control
fairly objectively for the effect of health on the labor/leisurechoice
instead of relying on self—reported disability status. The entire 1972
sample is composed of 8,633 adults who reported at least a slight disability
and 9,364 non—disabled adults, including 1,745 persons who had recovered from
previous disabilities.
An important problem occurs in selecting and defining the sample of
actual or potential applicants over which to estimate the utility model. On
the SDNA data tape, the survey data was matched with SSA entitlement records,
which include such information as the date an individual filed for any kind21
of Social Security benefit, the date or dates he became entitled and the type
of benefit and benefit amounts received by him and his family. However, a
record of filing for a Social Security benefit was only included for
individuals who claimed and were confirmed to be receiving one, and not for
individuals who may have applied but not been awarded benefits, whether for
technical or medical reasons. Thus, it was quite straightforward to define
the sample of individuals who were accepted applicants as individuals with
SSA records of entitlement to DI benefits. In differentiating rejected
applicants from non—applicants, however, it was necessary to rely on self-
reported data.
The sample of rejected applicants was taken to be all individuals who
satisfy the disability—insured requirement and who report applying for, but
not receiving DI benefits and have no DI benefit entitlement record. The
final sample consists of 4,214 men and 1,651 women. Of the men in the
sample, 927 or 22 percent were DI receipients and 706 or 17 percent were
rejected applicants (see Table 1).1 Of the women in the sample, 319 or 19
percent were recipients and 351 or 21 percent were rejected applicants.
Thus, approximately the same percentage of the men and women in the sample,
40 percent, had applied for benefits. Most of the DI recipients are over 55
and the percentage between the ages of 56 and 65 was about 55 percent for men
and women, both white and non-whites in all categories tend to be younger
than whites.
.Thesample of applicants consists of somewhat fewer DI recipients (57
percent) than were observed in the population. In 1972, 60 percent of
applications were granted and in previous years this percentage was slightly
higher. Since the figure observed for the sample reflects the disposition of
applications filed in all years since the program's inception, the higher
mortality rate of DI recipients might account for the difference in the
figures for the sample and the population.TABLE 1: Applicant Status of the Sample
Total Men women
DI Recipients 1,246 927 319
Rejected Applicants 1 ,057 706 351
Nonapplicants 3,562 2,581 981
Total 5,865 4,214 1,651
TIBLE 2: Age and
(numbers








808 (ioo) 119 (ioo)
101 (12) 17 (14)
225 (28) 40 (34)
479 (56) 60 (50)






612 (100) 94 (ioo)
104 (17) 16 (17)
123 (20) 29 (31)
278 (45) 39 (41)






2,396 (100) 185 (ioo)
870 (36) 78 (42)
800 (33) 54 (29)
674 (28) 51 (28)
52 (2) 2 (1)
1• Percentages maynot add to100 due to rounding.TABLE 3:Age and Raceofthe Applicant Groups, Female
(numbers in parentheses are percentages)'
White Nonwhite
DI Recipients (Total) 315 (100) 56 (100)
Under 45 39 (12) 3 (5)
45—55 97 (31) 19 (34)
56—65 175 (56) 31 (55)
Over 65 4 (i) 3 (5)
Rejected Applicants (Total) 350 (100) 60 (ioo)
Under45 49 (14) 9 (15)
45—55 82 (23) 14 (23)
56—65 182 (52) 32 (53)
Over 65 37 (ii) 5 (8)
Nonapplicants (Total) 971 (100) 163 (100)
Under 45 348 (36) 78 (48)
45—55 310 (32) 48 (29)
56—65 279 (29) 34 (21)
Over65 34 (4Y 3 (2)
1• Percentages maynot add to100due to rounding.
'!ABLE4:Tear ofEntitlementtoBenefits for DI Recipients
(numbersin parentheses are percentages)'
Year Male Female
Before1960 15 (2) 5 (i)
1960—1965 284 (31) 137 (37)
1966—1 968 241 (26) 73 (20)
1969—1970 278 (30) 122 (33)
1971—1972 109 (12) 34 (9)
Total 927 (lao) 371 (lao)24
Table 4 shows tne year of entitlement for DI recipients. Very few recipients
had 'been entitled before 1960 which is not surprising since the program was
fairly small in early years.
One of the major problems faced by empirical investigators of the
behavior of disabled individuals is the absence of an objective measure of
physical and emotional impairment. Most studies have beenforced to rely on
individuals' self—reported disability status to measure the extent to which
their health problems or functional limitations interf'er with their ability
to perform duties required by jobs for which they have been or could be
trained. Self-reported measures, however, may be biased by an individual's
desire to justify not being employed, as well as by the fact that a question
about whether someone is disabled may be interpreted in different ways by
different individuals. Ideally, one would like to have an objective measure,
such as a doctor's medical and psychiatric evaluation, to control properly
for the effect that thysical or emotional imairment, as opposed to
attitudinal factors, has on an individual's labor force behavior and
willingness to apply for benefits from earnings-replacement programs.For
large cross—sectional data sources, however, this kind ofinformation has not
beencollected and itis probably prohibitively expensive to do so. Thus, we
are forced to rely on self—reported information.
The surveydata we are using has gone farther than anyother currently
availabledatasource to collect the kind of objective information, albeit
self—reported, necessary to permit the impact of the economic variablesthat
areof principal interest to be measured. Severaldifferent kinds of
questions were posed to survey respondents: their physical ailments or
symptoms, such as pain and weakness; their specific disabling health
conditions, such as cancer or heart trouble; and the extent to which theirmobility is impaired. In all, there are about 75 different dichotomous
variables that might provide explanatory power in a study of the decision to
apply for D benefits, and it would be impossible to include them all. Thus,
these 75 variables must be reduced to a few variables that Fepresent
accurately the factors that are important in the application decision.
Three general approaches to the development of a set of health variables
to be included in the analysis of the application decision suggest
themselves. First, on an a priori basis a subset of the binary variables
could be chosen. For example, it seems reasonable that restrictions in motor
capacities, such as walking, standing and reaching, might be objective
indications of health status. The inclusion of responses to the nine
ouestions on motor capacity might be sufficient to represent all the health
factors that influence an individual's work capability. For example, it is
not necessarily important to ow whether an individual has multiple
sclerosis or has had a leg amputated in order to determine whether he will
have difficulty performing certain job activities. The important factor is
whether he can walk or use the stairs if these activities are reauired for
the performance of his current or a potential job. Thus, if the set of motor
capacity questions were sufficiently exhaustive and accurate, there should be
no increase in information on work capability and application probability
from including the responses to questions on specific disabling health
conditions.
While the same problem of self—justification arises in using the answers
to these mobility questions as with the answers to the questions about
whether the individual has a disability that interferes with his work, the
questions are less likely to receive biased responses because they are
specific. Moreover, the mobility questions were originally posed in the26
following way: "Do you have any difficulty performing any of tfle activities
on this card?" The nine mobility factors were presented on cards and the
individual was asked whether he had difficulty or was completely incapable of
performing the activity. No allusion was made to whether the inability to
perform a job, that is, whether the individual considered himself to have a
work disability because of the mobility impairment. Thus, it is less likely
to that an individual who was not working would seek to justify his non-
participation by falsifying these responses. In addition, the questions
about health conditions were asked before the questions concerning work
limitations. In addition to the mobility questions, seven questions on
physical ailments, such as pain and weakness, eight questions ostensively on
the physical environment, and three questions on hearing, sight and speaking
difficulty were asked. The responses to whichever subgroup or subgroups of
these auestions are judged most relevant for determining the impact of poor
health on the application decision should be included.
A second possible way to include the health variables would be to weigh
the responses to the individual mobility, physical ailment, environmental
sensitivity and sensory questions with predetermined weights, combining them
into a small number of variables that index the degree to which the
individual's impairments limit his ability to work. We have used government—
program set of weights to combine the responses, similar to the weights used
by workmen's compensation program to determine the extent of disability and
hence the number of weeks of benefits to which the individual should be
entitled. These weights have an advantage over other methods in that they
are theoretically justifiableon the basis of physicians' evaluations of the
extent to which an individual requires the use of various parts of the bodyto perform his job. However, a certain amount of investigator judement is
still required in order to translate the answers to the questions asked in
the SDNA into the workmen's compensation formulas. A third method to include
the health variables is to use a statistical method to determine a weighting
function. We have used the method of principal components to do so. All
three methods are utilized in the empirical models.
In the utility maximization and probability of acceptance equations, we
have used two weighted health variables, the first principal comDonent of the
responses to nine questions on individuals' functional limitations and index
constructed using weights derived from the workmen's compensation (wc)
program. The principal component variable (FNCTN) combined responses to
yes/no questions about whether an individual had difficulty performing
functions such as lifting, stooping, standing and reading. To help interpret
the results, 'we note that its meaninour sample used to estimate the
acceptance ecuation's 1.8 withaminimum of zero and a maximum of about 5.
The basis for the WC—'based health variable is described in a paper by
Bu.rfield.1 Hishealthvariable, which he calls the functional limitations
scale (FLS),isbased on the American Medical Association's Guide to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,2 in which each body function is assigned
a percentage of the whole body, and total body impairment is calculated based
on the combined effect of the impairments of the various functions. Since
the medical information needed to apply the AMA criteria is not available
from Burfield's data base, the principles of the AMA evaluation procedure
.BradBurfield, "A Scale for Measuring Functional Limitations," Health
Studies Program Working Paper No. 26, Syracuse University, April 1978.
2•American Medical Association, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment, 1977.28
were applied to the symptoms and functional limitations reported by survey
respondents. In addition, information on specific medical conditions was
incorporated when useful. The FLS index ranges from zero to 100.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative proportions for DI recipients, rejected
applicants and nonapplicants in the sample by FLS groupings.As was
expected, the chart shows that DI recipients tend to be more severely
impaired than either rejected applicants or nonapplicants, andthat rejected
applicanl;s are generally more impaired than nonapplicants. However, a
significant proportion of DI recipients, about 10 percent, are less than 10
percent impaired which on a priori grounds seems too small towarrant their
being granted DI benefits. The criteria for less than 10 percent disability
are very weak. The individual responds only that he has breathing problems
or has difficulty handling or lifting light objects. Thus it issomewhat
surprising that any of the individuals in this category are DI recipients.
There are two FLS values at which a considerable clustering of the
sample appears ——10percent and 85 percent. An individual with a 10 percent
disability responds only that his activities are limited without specifying
which ones, or that he has breathing difficulty and difficulty lifting heavy
objects or using stairs. These criteria are fairly broad and could be
indicative of an enormous range of health problems. The clustering at 85
percent impairment occurs because blindness is rated as an 85 percent
impairment and a large portion of the sample reports blindness and no other
limitation. The relatively large number of applicants, both accepted and
rejected, with greater than 85 percent impairment reflects the fact that many
blind individuals also have other health problems.
In evaluating the expected utility of being a DI applicant, an
individual assesses his probability of being accepted to the program if he














being eligible is the same information used by the SSA in arriving at
eligibility decisions, and that the individual forms an unbiased estimate of
his actual chances of being granted benefits. One reason to expect this to
be true is that an individual interested in applying for DI benefits will
engage in preliminary discussions with employees in the state SSA office, and
he is likely to be informed at that time, while information to support his
application is being gathered, of the probability that his application will
be successful.
The equation estimated to predict the probability then an individual
will be granted DI benefits assumes that there is no sample selection bias,
i.e., that the sample of actual applicants used to estimate the equation
does not differ from the population of applicants and non applicants to which
it is being applied. This assumption seems reasonable since the statutory
an actual criteria used by the Social Security Administration involve
observable characteristics that can be quantified in both applicants and
nonapplicants. In addition to health, the Di program regulations specify
that educational and vocational factors should be considered in decisions on
whether an individual's disability is sufficiently severe to warrant granting
him DI benefits. Since prospects for retraining someone decline as he grows
older, the probability of acceptance should increase with age. While nothing
in the disability evaluation regulations would suggest that marital status or
sex should be significant, these two variables might be taken into account
and we decided to test their influence.31
TABLE5.The Probabilityof Being Granted DI Benefits
Probit Asymptotic
Variable1 Mean Coefficient Standard Error
CONSTANT 1.0 .275 .229
AGEAPPS 5.35 -.006 .004
AGE SQUARED 132.9 —.0019 .0003
FLS CODE 33.8 .0013 .0012
FIRST PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 1.80 .292 .039
PAIN .70 .024 .078
FAINT .38 .080 .072
MOBDOORS .64 .197 .148
ACCIDENT .31 —.062 .074
MENTAL .06 .618 .156
.19 .280 .087
RESPIRATORY .34 .008 .071
EDUCATION 8.6 -.009 .009
MARRIED .94 —.379 .156
NO.OF CHILDREN .68 —.041 .027
WHITE .87 .036 .103
HO VALUE 42.0 .002 .0008
ASSETS 28.5 —.0006 .0004
OTHER INCOME 3.76 .00009 .0002
Other variables included: Dummy variables
for region and for rural residence.
Log of Likelihood Function —1000.2
Percentage of Sample Accepted 50.2
Nuniber of Observations 1475
1For definitions of variables, see Table 5k which follows.52
Table 5A. Definition of Variables
AGEAPPS:Age at time of survey (1972) —50
FLS CODE: FLS health index. Constructed from Workman's Compensation
Formulae.
FIRST PRINCIPAL COMPONENT: First principal component of 9 functional
limitation dummies which have value 1 if the individual's
functional ability is impaired, 0 otherwise.
PAIN: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual frequently feels
pain, 0 otherwise.
FAINT: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual can get around
outdoors without help, 0 otherwise.
MOBDOORS: Dummy variable with value 1 if the individual can use doors
without help.
ACCIDENT: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual's condition is
caused by accident, 0 otherwise.
MENTAL: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual's health condition
involves illness or retardation, 0 otherwise.
NERVES: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual has a nervous
condition, 0 otherwise.
RESPIRATORY: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual has a health
condition, such as emphysema, that involves breathing, 0
otherwise.
EIUCATION: Highest grade completed.
REGION 1: Dummy variable with value 1 if lives in the northeast,
O otherwise.
REGION 2: Dummyvariablewith value 1 if lives in the northcentral,
0 otherwise.
REGION 3:Dummyvariable with value 1 if lives in the south,
O otherwise.
NOTMAR: Dummy variable with value 1 if the individual is not
married.
RACE: Dummy variable with value 1 if individual is nonwhite.
RURB: Dummy variable =1if lives in rural area or small city,
0 otherwise.33
Table 5 shows the estimated probability of acceptance equation for a
sample of 1475 men less than age 50 who applied in our sample.1 e chose to
estimate our model on this group of individuals so that interactions with the
Social Security Retirement program are not a major factor. A more complex
model would be required to account jointly for the DI program and Retirement
program.
The functional limitations index constructed from the first principal
component is extemely significant while the FLS health index only has a small
additional effort. At the mean of the data the effect of the FLS index is
less than 10% of the effect of the alternative index. These two indices were
developed to measure the same factor, namely, an individual's ability to
perform the activities that are necessary to hold a job or take care of
himself. The FLS index, while it is a more complex and comprehensive
measure, turned out to be only weakly correlated with the likelihood of being
an applicant and to have limited explanatory power when the funtional
limitations index is included. Other health condition measures added some
explanatory rower, in particular the ability to go out of doors without help
and having a mental illness or nervous condition.
Two of the important factors in a disabled individual's decision whether
to apply for DI are his expected earnings if he does not apply and his
expected earnings if he applies and is rejected. Unfortunately, at least one
of these variables is missing for each member of the sample. If an
.Ifa rejected applicant's probability of acceptance is lower than that of
someone applying for the first time, some bias could be introduced in the
empirical work if the probability of acceptance does not include a variable
that accounts for denial of a previous application. Unfortunately, the
probability of acceptance equation does not include such a variable because
the data tape did not provide enough information to ascertain the existence
or disposition of previous applications.34
individualnever apçlied and is currently working, his current earnings are
given but there is no information on what his earningswould have been if he
had applied and been rejected. If an individual applied and was rejected and
is working, we have his "rejected applicant" wage but no informationabout
his "nonapplicant" earnings. If the individual is receiving DI benefits, no
information about either relevant earnings variable is given. Thus, it was
necessary to input at least one wage variable for eachmember of the sample.
To impute the missin wage variables a reduced form specification is
estimated. This log wage equation is used then to determine the decrease in
a person's wage if he applies for DI and is turned down sohe must reenter
the labor force. We initially included two sample selection variables, but
neither variable turned out to be important. The first variable was for the
probability of applying while the second variable was for the probabilityof
beingaccepted.Theprobitequation for the probability ofbeingaccepted is
derivedfrom Table 5.However,the probability model for applying was a
reduced form of the structural utility model which is estimated subsequently.
Efficient estimation would have required simultaneous estimation of the
entire wage andutilitymodel. We decided to forego this added computational
complexity,especially since we did not find evidence of sample selection
effects in the estimated wage equation.TABLE 6. Log lage Equation for Males
Variablek Coefficient Standard Error
CONSTANT .638 .088
AGEAPPS -.009 .002
AGE SQUARED -.0004 .0001
FLS CODE -.0002 .0005
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT —.353 .163
EDUCATION .044 .003
REGION 1 .011 .043
REGION 2 .014 .040












Number of observations 1475
Standard deviation .235
1For definition of variables, see Table 5A.36
The results of estimating the wage equation for the sample of men are
shown in Table 6.Marital status and amount of education are positively
related to wages, while health, residence in the south, being non—white and
being unmarried are negatively related. Note the large effect of health on
the wage. A person with the mean health characteristics in the sample has a
wage 64.2% lower than a healthy individual with otherwiseidentical
characteristics. Thus, in principle, health has both an important direct
effect on labor supply and an indirect effect because of the effect of health
on the wage. The most important coefficient for use in the subsequent
estimation is the coefficient for individuals who did not apply. It is
e;timated to be -.092. The estimate implies that an individual who applied
but is rejected has a wage of exp—(.092) =.912lower than a nonapplicant.
We use this estimate to determine the ratio for w and w ,thewages of n a -
nonapplicantsand applicants, respectively.'
We now proceed to estimate the combined probability of application and
labor supply model of the last section. We divided the sample into men
younger than age 50 and men age 50 and over. We present estimates here only
for the younger group. The sample is restricted to applicants who applied
for DI between 1967 and 1971 as well as those individuals who did not apply.
Therefore, our results should be indicative of the situation in the early
1970's in the DI program.
For non applicants, the comparison of utilities was made as of the end
of 1971. For applicants, the estimated wage was deflated to the value in the
1 An earlier version of the paper estimated the ratio to be .51 rather than
.91. However, this estimate arose from an error between earnings and wages.
While earnings do decrease by about 50%, most of this decrease is due to
fewer hours of work.37
year in which the individual applied, using tne ratio of average hourly wages
in 1971 and year of application. Earnings histories, reported year of
application for rejected applicants, and the Social Security Administration
benefits formula were used to calculate DI benefits for those individuals in
the sample who were not receiving DI benefits. For nonapplicants, the
benefit the individual would have been entitled to in 1971 was imputed.
Adjustments were made for dependent children's and spouses' benefits. The
model from equation (8) of the last section determines the decision on
whether an individual applies. The individual compares the utility achieved
if he does not apply with the expected value of the uncertain outcomes if he
does apply. To make this latter calculation he uses the probability of
acceptance and decline in his wage if he applies but is rejected. Both the
probability of acceptance and the decline in the wage are derived from the
estimates in Tables 5 and 6.The parameters of the model can be most easily
interrreted with respect to the labor supply function of equation (7) and the
parameter which is the parameter which measures the degree of risk aversion.
We present the results in Table 7.TABLE 7:Estimate8 of Application andLaborSupply Model1
Variable 0 Fixed 0 Varying
i.Non-labor income (virtual):ó -.122 -.121
(.024) (.064)
2. Wage a .023 .024
(.005) (.059)
3. Constant
1 .51 1 .49
(.133) (.385)
4. Education .199 .196
(.059) (.086)
5. Number of Children —.021 —.029
(.012) (.030)











10. Age .037 .030
(.023) (.076)
11. Accident .013 .011
(.040) (.024)
12.Respiratory Distress —.076 —.076
(.045) (.046)
13.Mental Problem —.486 -.466
(.096) (.099)





16. Mobility through doors —.267 —.269
(.099) (.102)
17. Nervous condition .303 -.303
(.058) (.059)
18. as .528 .548
(.024) (.078)
19. a71 .475 .472
(.024) (.ii)
20.Theta or MeanRiskAversion -4.48 —4.50
Parameter for Normal fist. (1.14) (.126)
21. Standard Derivation for Normal .170
Distribution for Risk Aversion (.012)
Log Likelihood —476.8 —450.8
Number of observations 1411 14-il
Hoursare measured in 1000's as is income. Asymptotic standard errors
are given in parenthesis. For variable definitions see page 32, Table
5A.40
The left hand column has the estimates with income taxes and social security
where 0, the parameter of risk aversion, is assumed constant in the
population. The estimates of the underlying labor supply model of equation
(2) seem quite good. The effect of nonlabor income is similar to Hausman
(1981a), while the direct effect of the wage on labor supply is quite small,
consistent with previous studies of male labor supply. Thus, individuals in
the sample behave much as other prime age males have been estimated to behave
except for the important difference which health creates. The health
coefficients have a quite large effect on the labor supply equation arid on
the probability of application since the probability of application rises as
work becomes less attractive. Note that at the mean value of the principal
component variable for health, an individual's desired hours of work decrease
by 462 hours per year compared to a person with no disability. The other
health index, the FLS code at its mean leads to a further decrease of 71
hours per year. Also, particular health problems such as mental problems,
lack of mobility through doors, andanervous condition each lead to a
further decrease in desired hours of work exceeding 250 hours per year. Age
seems to have little effect which might be expected given our sample of
younger men. The components of variance indicate the importance of variation
in tastes in determining work behavior which is a finding also present in
previous studies of male labor force behavior.
The other part of the model besides the labor supply specification is
the application model which incorporates individual's attitudes towards risk.
Here, the key parameter is 0 which is the coefficient of risk aversion in our
constant relative risk aversion specification of equation (3). The
coefficient of risk aversion, 0, is estimated to be -4.5 which indicates a
substantial degree of risk aversion. The estimate of 0 is quite good, but41
the estimate is very sensitive to the ratio the decrease in the market
wage if an individual applied for DI and was rejected. This ratio along with
health status are the major determinants of the application decision. Note
that health status has an importance influence on the desired hours of work
as discussed above as well as an additional important influence through the
probability of acceptance model in Table 5.
Variation in 0 is now included by permitting the parameter of risk
aversion to vary in the population according to a normal distribution.
Equations (13) and (14) demonstrate the method used to allow 0 to vary.1
As can be seen in Table 7, the coefficients of the parameters in the
model are extremelyclose to the case when 0 is held constant. However, tle
value of the maximized likelihood function does increase by 21 .0 which
indicates the presence of dispersion in the population. The mean parameter
of the normal distribution is estimated to be —4.50 which is extremely close
to the model estimated without variation. The findings indicate a
statistically significant amount of dispersion in risk aversion in the
opu1ationalthough the amountof variation is not large with the standard
deviationofthe distribution of riskaversion estimated to be .170.
However, the interpretation of our results must be limited due to the assumed
functionalformof the distributionfor theta.
.Thismodel proved quite difficult to estimate. The accuracy of the
estimatedasymptotic standard errors is especially doubtful because of the
use of numerical integration in the calculations.42
e now use estimates from Table 7tosimulate what changes inthe
probabilityof acceptance would do to the number of applicants forLI.In
our sample .079 of all individuals have applied for DI.Ourmodelpredicts
that .073wouldapply which is quite close given that the model is basically
one of labor supply under uncertainty. For each individual we now alter the
probability of acceptance either upward or downward by a given amount. We
then compute the probabilities across individuals and take an average to
determine the effect of changes in the probability of acceptance. The
results of the simulation are given in Table 8. The results in Table 8
indicate that a change in the probability has an important effect, although
it is not particularly large. For instance, if the probability of acceptance
is multiplied by .7 the predicted number of applicants falls by about 6.8%.43
TABLE8:Siinulatione for ChangeeinProbability of Acceptance
Probability of Application












If tne probability of acceptance falls by .5 which is approximately the
change from 1 975 to 1 981, the model predicts that applications will fall by
about 13.7% which is approximately what has been observed in the period.
Note that a 14% decrease is about half way between 8% and 19% which we
calculated to be the bounds of the actual decline in DI applications over the
period. Therefore, the model which is fit on cross section data seems to
predict the subsequent times series results quite well. However, we found
that other specifications could also fit the subsequent time series results
almost equally well.
In our last simulation we consider the effect on applications of a fall
in DI benefits which may occur due to the change in COLA provisions in Social
Security given the 1982 legislation andtheproposed 1985 legislation.
Results are given in Table 9.Herewe note thatapplicationsare sensitive
to the benefits. If benefits were to decrease to .8 of the level used in the
model we find that arplications would decrease by 21.9. Therefore, our
estimates indicate that the applications decision is a good deal more
sensitive to benefit levels thantothe probability of acceptance. While it
is difficult to decide whether the increase in DI benefits in the 1970's
'explains' a large proportion of the decrease in male labor force
participation of prime age males, the benefit level does have a significant
and sizeable effect on the decision to apply for DI.1
Havemann and Wolfe (1984) conclude that the benefit level has only a small
effect on DI in contrast to the findings of earlier research.4c
TABLE 11: Probability of Application
withBenefits Changed
Social Security Benefit
Average probability of applying
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